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Clearly Ambiguous: A Visitor's View of
the Irish Abortion Referendum of 2002
STEVEN J. JOHANSEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Around the middle of February 2002, political posters began
appearing on the streets of Ireland in anticipation of the Abortion
Referendum 1 election scheduled for March 6. Some of these signs
urged support for the Referendum with slogans such as "Protect
Women, Save Babies-Vote Yes!" and "Let's Learn from the
Mistakes of Other Countries-Vote Yes!" An outside observer-
who was unaware of the details of the upcoming vote, but well
aware of the abortion debate in the United States-would consider
these signs ambiguous at best. Protecting women sounded like a
pro-choice slogan.2 Saving babies certainly sounded like pro-life
rhetoric. With respect to learning the mistakes of other countries,
an outside observer would have to ask: Which countries?
Although the signs were ambiguous at best, one poster clarified
the Referendum to some extent. It urged voters to: "Vote Pro-life,
Vote Yes."
* Associate Professor, Lewis and Clark Law School; Visiting Legal Writer,
University College Cork, Spring, 2002. I wish to thank the many colleagues in Ireland and
the United States who supported this effort. In particular, Susan Moloney, Irene Lynch-
Fannon, Maeve McDonagh, Dierdre Madden, Darius Whelan, all of UCC, Daryl Wilson
and Susan Mandiberg of Lewis and Clark, and Professor Davalene Cooper of New
England School of Law. Finally, I wish to thank Katherine H. Johansen for her excellent
research support.
1. See generally Twenty-fifth Amendment, Constitution of Ireland (Protection of
Human Life in Pregnancy Bill) (2001) (Ir.), http://www.doh.ie/pdfdocs/propprot.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Referendum].
2. This article attempts to remain neutral as to the merits of the abortion debate.
However, terms like "pro-choice" and "pro-life" are of course, value laden rhetoric. Such
references to advocates on both sides of the debate are intended to reflect only the terms
the advocates use to identify themselves.
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In response, the opposition entered the rhetorical battle with
signs urging a "No" vote. Within days, seemingly every Irish light
standard sported two or three referendum posters. However, the
"No" supporters did not clarify the issue any further. Some pro-
choice supporters cautioned voters: "Don't Make Women's Lives
Worth Less-Vote No." Other posters were even more strident,
claiming: "Babies Will Die-Vote No!" To make matters more
confusing, some "No" posters were sponsored by the Pro-Life
Committee.
If one relied solely on the political posters for information
about the Referendum, one would conclude that a "Yes" vote
would protect women and the lives of the unborn, while a "No"
vote would protect the value of the lives of women and prevent
babies from dying. Undoubtedly, many voters found the
Referendum puzzling. In addition, it is not surprising that a
referendum on abortion would be controversial, especially in
Ireland. It is surprising, however, that the Referendum, drafted
after a five-year government study, could be attacked as fatally
ambiguous by both its opponents and proponents.
This Article examines the merits of those attacks and
concludes the Referendum was relatively clear on its face even
though the abortion issues remain politically and morally
ambiguous. Despite the relative clarity of the Referendum, it
remained vulnerable to charges of ambiguity and vagueness for at
least three reasons. First, in an apparent effort to reach a
compromise, the Referendum included some provisions that
appealed to pro-life voters and others that appealed to pro-choice
voters. The effort to achieve compromise failed because both
camps found reasons to oppose the Referendum. Second, the
drafters sought to resolve the legal status of emergency
contraception 3 but failed to anticipate all the potential
constitutional challenges that opponents were likely to raise. This
failure substantiated charges that the passage of the Referendum
would result in unintended consequences. Finally, the government
presented the Referendum to its constituencies when voters were
particularly skeptical of the government's ability to craft an
unambiguous referendum on abortion. Public skepticism made it
especially difficult to counter charges of ambiguity in the
Referendum.
3. Referendum § 1.1.
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Part II of this Article reviews the legal context and the recent
history of the abortion issue in Ireland. Part III presents the
Referendum. Part IV explores the claims that the Referendum
was ambiguous. Part V asserts that the political climate in Ireland
made it particularly difficult for supporters of the Referendum to
counter charges of ambiguity. Part VI concludes the referendum
process is an ineffective vehicle for implementing laws
fundamentally controversial in nature, especially laws regarding
abortion.
II. HISTORY OF THE ABORTION ISSUE IN IRELAND
A. Prevailing Anti-Abortion Attitude in Ireland
Historically, Ireland prohibited abortion by statute. 4 The
Offences Against the Person Act made abortion a felony
punishable by life in prison.5 In addition, the Irish Supreme Court
in McGee v. Attorney General alluded in dicta that the
Constitution also prohibited abortion. 6  Although the Court
recognized the right to marital privacy as an unenumerated right
under Article 40.3,7 Justice Walsh noted the Court was not
recognising a right to abortion. Indeed, he stated that:
[A]ny action on the part of either the husband and wife or of
the State to limit family sizes by endangering or destroying
human life must necessarily not only be an offence against the
common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of
the human life in question. 8
While the Court continued to refer to abortion in dicta,9 it did
not address the issue directly until the 1980s. During this time,
anti-abortion activists sought to eliminate the possibility that the
Court would create a right to abortion or that the Oireachtas (the
Irish Parliament) would enact legislation permitting abortion.
10
Eventually, these activists successfully lobbied the Oireachtas to
submit a voter referendum, which expressly protected the life of
4. Offences Against the Person Act, No. 58 (1861) (Ir.).
5. Id.
6. [1974] McGee v. Attorney Gen., I.R. 284, 313 (Ire.).
7. McGee, [1974] I.R. at 296-97.
8. 1& at 312.
9. G v. An Bord UchtAla, [19801 I.R. 32, 69 (Ire.) (Walsh, J.); Norris v. Attorney
Gen., [19841 I.R. 36, 103 (Ire.) (McCarthy, J., dissenting).
10. JAMES KINGSTON & ANTHONY WHELAN, ABORTION AND THE LAW 4 (1997).
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the unborn. In effect, that referendum, which eventually became
the Eighth Amendment, amended the Constitution. In September
1983, the voters approved the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution, which became Article 40.3.3.11 From that point on,
the Constitution has been at the heart of the abortion debate in
Ireland.
To understand Article 40.3.3, one must place it in the context
of the Irish Constitution as a whole. The Constitution reflects the
social and political fabric that defines Ireland, including its strong
historical ties with the Catholic Church and its support for the
traditional family. Indeed, the Preamble to the Constitution
acknowledges in express language the importance of the Christian
religion to Ireland:
In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all
authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men
and States must be referred,
We, the people of tire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord,
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of
trial,
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle
to regain the rightful independence of our Nation,
And seeking to promote the common good, with due
observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity
and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order
attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord
established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this
Constitution.1
2
The Constitution strikes a balance between Ireland's strong
ties to the Christian faith and the right of people of all faiths to
practice their religion. While there is a separation between church
and state, the wall between the two is considerably closer to the
church house door in Ireland than it is in the United States.
Ireland does not "endow any religion."1 3 In addition, it does not
11. Id at 5.
12. Pmbl., Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
13. Id. Art. 44.2.2.
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discriminate on the basis of "religious profession, belief, or
status." 14  However, the Constitution provides that Ireland
"acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to
Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall
respect and honour religion."'15
Furthermore, the Constitution expressly recognises the
central role of the family in Irish society:
The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and
fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent
and superior to all positive law.
The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its
constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order
and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the
State.
16
It is within this context of strong and explicit support for
Christian (and implicitly, Catholic) religion and the traditional
family unit, that the Irish electorate voted, by nearly a two-to-one
margin, to adopt the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. 17
That Amendment states:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with
due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in
its laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its laws to
defend and vindicate that right.
18
On its face, the Eighth Amendment, now incorporated into
Article 40.3, establishes a broad, but not unlimited, right to life for
the unborn. It also expressly recognises a right to life for the
mother. At some point, however, the respective rights of the
unborn will conflict with the rights of the mother. Most obviously,
those rights conflict when continuing a pregnancy puts the
mother's life at risk. The issue then becomes: At what point does
that risk outweigh the right of the unborn? This has been one of
three abortion issues that the Irish courts have wrestled with since
1992.
14. Id. Art. 44.2.3.
15. Id. Art. 44.1.1.
16. Id Art. 41.1
17. KINGSTON & WHELAN, supra note 10, at 180 n.1.
18. Art 40.3.3, Constitution of Ireland, 1999.
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B. The X Case
Until 1992, the Irish Supreme Court had consistently used the
Eighth Amendment to restrain efforts by pro-choice advocates to
expand the availability of abortion in Ireland.19 For example, Irish
health clinics were prohibited from providing information about
hospitals that perform abortions. 20 Similarly, in Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children v. Grogan, student organizations
were prevented from distributing information about different
countries that perform abortions. 21 After Grogan, it appeared that
the Supreme Court would continue to block all efforts to expand
access to abortions. Yet, three years later in the Attorney General
v. X (the X Case), the Court seemed to take a more liberal stand
regarding abortion.
22
The plaintiff in the X Case was a fourteen-year-old girl who
had been sexually abused and impregnated by the father of one of
her friends.23 The pregnancy caused great distress for both the
plaintiff and her parents. The plaintiff claimed to be suicidal.
After much consideration, the plaintiff left Ireland for Great
Britain where she planned to have an abortion. The unfortunate
ordeal probably would have resulted in a private resolution shortly
thereafter had she and her parents been less conscientious.
Instead, her parents contacted the Irish police to inquire if they
should obtain DNA samples to assist in the prosecution of their
daughter's abuser. The police contacted the Attorney General
who immediately obtained an injunction against the plaintiff,
thereby preventing her from obtaining an abortion and ordering
the plaintiff and her parents to return to Ireland for the next nine
months. The High Court, and ultimately the Supreme Court
reviewed that injunction.
The High Court predictably held that the injunction was
valid.24  The court also held the right of the unborn child
19. See generally KINGSTON & WHELAN, supra note 10, at 1-36 (providing a
thorough review of the historical development of Irish abortion law); Keith S. Koegler,
Note, Ireland's Abortion Information Act of 1995, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117,
1118-32.
20. See Soc'y for the Prot. of Unborn Children v. Open Door Counseling Ltd., [1988]
I.R. 593,617 (Ire.).
21. Soc'y for the Prot. of Unborn Children v. Grogan, [1989] I.R. 753,764 (Ire.).
22. Attorney Gen. v. X, [199211 I.R. 1 (Ire.) [hereinafter The X Case].
23. Id. Her parents were also named plaintiffs, though the relevant portions of the
case concerned only the rights of the young woman.
24. Id. at 16.
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outweighed the plaintiff's right to travel outside of Ireland to
obtain an abortion.25 As a result, the plaintiff appealed to the
Supreme Court.
In the appeal that included "everything but the kitchen sink,"
the plaintiff raised twenty-two assignments of error.26  The
Supreme Court reduced those claims to four issues, two of which
are relevant here. First, the Court balanced the unborn child's
right to life against the mother's rights under the Eighth
Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's
decision and held that where there was a "real and substantial
risk" to the life of the mother, an abortion was legal in Ireland.
27
This effectively resolved the X Case.
Second, the Supreme Court addressed in dicta, whether the
Eighth Amendment limited a woman's right to travel to the extent
that the State could enjoin a woman from leaving Ireland to have a
legal abortion in another jurisdiction. The High Court recognized
that the Eighth Amendment protected the right to life of both the
unborn child and the mother.28 The High Court, however, held
that an abortion would definitely end the life of the unborn child.
Conversely, denying an abortion to a mother who is suicidal would
not, with the same degree of certainty, end her life. Therefore, the
High Court concluded that in the case of a potentially suicidal
mother, the unborn child's right to life should prevail.
29
The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning. Instead, the
Supreme Court reasoned that an abortion will always end the life
of the unborn child, and thus, the risk of death could not be the
scale used to balance the competing interests. The Supreme Court
held that the appropriate test is whether there is a "real and
substantial risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the
mother, which can only be avoided by the termination of her
pregnancy." 30 In cases where there is such a risk, termination is
permissible.31
In the X Case, the plaintiff made repeated statements
suggesting a desire to commit suicide. A psychologist testified that
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. Id. at 42-45.
27. Id. at 55 (Finlay, C.J.).
28. Id. at 11.
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id. at 53-54.
31. Id.
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those desires presented a very real threat. The Supreme Court
found those threats sufficient to establish a "real and substantial
risk" to the plaintiff's life.32 As a result, the question of whether
the plaintiff could travel outside of Ireland to have an abortion
became moot because the Supreme Court held the plaintiff could
have an abortion in Ireland. Strangely, the Court still provided
rather detailed dicta regarding that issue. The Court, however,
was not particularly clear on how it would rule if the issue of a
woman's right to travel ever came before the Court.
C. Issues Created by the X Case
The issue of travel raised several sub-issues. Should the
unenumerated right to travel be balanced against the right to life
of the unborn? Should a court issue an injunction that might not
be followed? Does European law prohibit such an injunction?
Chief Justice Finlay stated that European law did not prohibit
a court from issuing an injunction,33 even if it would be difficult to
enforce. 34 However, Finlay did not expressly address the heart of
the issue-whether a court could limit a woman's right to travel to
protect the unborn child's right to life.
Justice Hederman, who dissented in the X Case, opined that a
court should not issue an injunction prohibiting travel.35 He
reasoned that if a woman violated an injunction, a court could only
find her in contempt of court. The court could not restore the life
of the unborn. 36 Thus, an injunction should not be issued because
it would not protect the life of the unborn. 37 Furthermore, Justice
McCarthy argued the right to travel could not be balanced against
the unborn child's right to life.38 He stated the right to travel
cannot be curtailed because of the reason for travelling. In other
words, he stated that intent is simply not a basis for restricting the
movement of Irish citizens,39 and that even if a person was leaving
Ireland for the purpose of committing a criminal act in another
jurisdiction, the State could not enjoin that travel. Therefore, the
32. Id at 55.
33. Id. at 61.
34. Id. at 59.
35. Id at 77 (Hederman, J.).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 84 (McCarthy, J.).
39. Id. at 85.
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Court could not enjoin the plaintiff from travelling to Britain to
have an abortion.40
Justice O'Flaherty contended that issuing an injunction would
unduly interfere with the authority of the family.41 He did not
base his opinion solely on the constitutional right to travel. He left
open the possibility for the Oireachtas to enact legislation
restricting the right to travel in such situations.42 He concluded
that in the absence of legislation, however, it was not appropriate
for the court to infringe on the plaintiff's freedom of movement.4
3
In contrast, Justice Egan reasoned the right to travel must
give way to the right to life of the unborn child.44 While he
acknowledged that enforcement of an injunction could be difficult,
Justice Egan stated that those difficulties could not outweigh the
unborn child's right to life. However, on the specific facts before
the Court, he held the injunction was improper because the
plaintiff was entitled to an abortion in Ireland, as her threatened
suicide created a real and substantial risk to her life.45
As to the specific injunction issued in the X Case, the Court
held it was not valid.46 The broader issue of whether the State
could limit the right to travel outside Ireland remained
unanswered. The Oireachtas, however, did not take long to
address that issue.
D. The Reaction to the X Case
After the surprising result in the X Case, the Oireachtas
immediately placed before the voters a set of three proposed
Constitutional amendments:
1. It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of the unborn unless
such termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from
the health, of the mother where there is an illness or disorder of
the mother giving rise to a real and substantial risk to her life,
not being a risk of self-destruction. 47
40. Id.
41. 1d at 88 (O'Flaherty, J.).
42 Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 92 (Egan, J.).
45. Id.
46. See generally id.
47. KINGSTON & WHELAN, supra note 10, at 19.
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2. [Article 40.3] shall not limit freedom to travel between the
State and another state.
48
3. [Article 40.3] shall not limit freedom to obtain or make
available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid
down by law, information relating to services lawfully available
in another state.
49
The three proposed amendments required the electorate to
consider each choice separately. A pro-choice voter (i.e. one that
favored a liberalization of Ireland's abortion laws) would vote No,
Yes, Yes, respectively. A zealous pro-life advocate, who opposed
abortion in any circumstance, would oppose all three amendments.
Conversely, a pro-life voter who did not oppose abortion to save
the life of the mother, but who sought to exclude abortion where
the mother was suicidal, would vote for the first amendment, but
likely oppose the latter two. Voters who found themselves in the
middle would have to assess each proposed amendment
independently of the others.
In the end, despite the potentially confusing array of choices,
the electorate spoke quite clearly. The first proposed amendment
failed by nearly a two-to-one margin. 50 The second and third
proposed amendments passed by nearly the same margin.51 By
the end of 1992, abortion law seemed more stable. Abortion was
legal if necessary to prevent a real and substantial threat to the life
of the mother. Suicide constituted such a threat. Furthermore,
travel to other jurisdictions to obtain an abortion could not be
restricted. Finally, although Article 40.3 did not directly restrict
the distribution of information about abortion services available in
other states, the Oireachtas could establish restrictions on the
distribution of information in Ireland. Just what conditions the
Oireachtas would place on the distribution of information was left
unanswered.
In 1995, the Oireachtas passed the Abortion Information
Act.52 This Act established limitations on the distribution of
48. Id. at 180.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 20. The amendment was rejected by 1,079,297 votes to 572,177 votes.
51. See id. at 180 n.1. The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution was approved
by 1,035,308 votes to 624,059, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution by
992,833 votes to 665,106.
52. Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of
Pregnancies) Act (1995) (Ir.); see also Koegler, supra note 19, at 1118-19.
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information referenced in the Fourteenth Amendment. It
provides that women are entitled to receive information about
abortion services. However, that information cannot advocate or
promote terminating a pregnancy. The Supreme Court rejected
constitutional challenges to the Abortion Information Act from
both pro-choice and pro-life advocates, 53 both of whom continued
to seek change through the Oireachtas as well as the courts.
Abortion continued to be a hot button political issue
throughout the late 1990s. In fact, the issue threatened to derail
Fianna Fail's campaign in 1997.54 In response, Fianna Fail's
leader, Bertie Ahern, promised to address the issue once he was in
government. 55 Although he did not expressly state how he would
address the controversy, he promised his government would
prepare a Green Paper on the issue in an effort to establish a
consensus.56  Ahern suggested the government could pursue
various options, including amending the Constitution to address
the X Case, pursuing legislation, or combining both through
Article 27.57 While his pledge was ambiguous, it allowed Ahern to
skirt the abortion issue during the campaign that eventually led to
his election as Taoiseach. Promising to address the abortion issue,
however, proved far easier than actually doing so once Ahern was
elected.
During the first four years of Ahern's term, he appointed a
committee to investigate the abortion issue. In 1999, that
committee produced a Green Paper, 58 in which the government
concluded that a referendum proposing a Constitutional
amendment was necessary to resolve the abortion issue.59 As a
53. In re Article 26 of the Constitution & the Regulation of Info. Serv. Outside the
State for the Termination of Pregnancies Bill, No. 87 (Ir. S.C. May 12, 1995), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/1995/9.html.
54. Fianna Fail is Ireland's most popular political party. In 1997, it regained control
of the government in 1997 and has remained in power since then.
55. Geraldine Kennedy, Ahern Pledges Action on X Case Issue, IR. TIMES, May 17,
1997, at 7 [hereinafter Kennedy, Ahern Pledges Action].
56. Id
57. Id.
58. INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON ABORTION, GOVERNMENT OF
IRELAND, GREEN PAPER ON ABORTION (1999), available at
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/251.pdf.; see also Kennedy, Ahern Pledges
Action, supra note 55.
59. See Taoiseach Paper Set to Open up Abortion Debate, OBSERVER (Sept. 5, 1999),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Northern-Ireland/Story?0,2763,200376,00.html.
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result, the government once again brought the abortion issue
before the electorate in 2002.
III. THE ABORTION REFERENDUM OF 2002
The government presented the Referendum, also known as
the Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act, as an effort to
build consensus through a comprehensive approach to the
abortion issue.60  As a practical matter, the Referendum
prohibited abortion except in cases where continuing a pregnancy
would result in a "real and substantial risk" to the mother.61
Suicide did not present such a risk, and thus, the Referendum
would have overturned the X Case. 62 In addition, any intentional
destruction of an unborn human life before implantation in the
womb was not considered an abortion.63
In producing the Referendum, the government sought the
advice of people representing all sides of the abortion issue. As a
result, the Referendum protected the lives of women as well as
unborn children. Even though the Referendum permitted
abortions in limited situations, the Catholic Bishops supported the
Referendum. 64  Furthermore, the Referendum arguably
guaranteed the availability of the "morning after" pill in Ireland
because it limited the meaning of abortion to ending life after
implantation in the womb.65 The government considered the
Referendum a thoughtful, clear, and carefully crafted resolution of
the abortion issue.
Unsurprisingly, not everyone viewed the Referendum in the
same light. Opponents quickly attacked the Referendum. Some
of those attacks were policy-based.66  Pro-choice advocates
objected to the elimination of the suicide exception that was
60. See Government Plans Comprehensive Approach, IR. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at 6
[hereinafter Government Plans Comprehensive Approach].
61. Referendum § 1.2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at § 1.1.
64. See Patsy McGarry & Mark Brennock, Bishops Support Abortion Poll Proposal,
IR. TIMES, Dec. 13,2001, at 1.
65. Carol Coulter, Legislation Proposed by Government Has Four Main Aims, IR.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at 6 [hereinafter Coulter, Four Main Aims].
66. See Press Release, Ruairi Quinn, Labor Party, This Referendum Will Be
Defeated (Feb. 7, 2002), at http://www.labour.ie/press/detail.tmpl?sku=20020207121549
(outlining opposition to Referendum).
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initially recognized in the X Case.67 Others objected to the twelve-
year prison sentence for violators. 68 Pro-life advocates, on the
other hand, objected to the Referendum because it failed to
protect embryos before implantation in the womb.69
The government certainly expected to see those policy-based
objections. To build consensus, however, the government had
distanced itself and the Referendum from those who held extreme
views. Despite the government's effort, opponents asserted the
Referendum was fraught with ambiguities that left important
questions unanswered and raised the possibility of unintended
consequences resulting from its enactment. 70 Claims of ambiguity
garnered further attention when the Council of Catholic Bishops
announced the Referendum prohibited the use of the "morning
after" pill. The non-partisan Referendum Counsel further clouded
the issue when it opined that the Referendum failed to resolve the
issue of the "morning after" pill.
By election time, the Referendum debate had shifted from its
fundamental merits to its apparent ambiguity. 71  Opponents
warned the voters that the passage of the Referendum would
result in unintended consequences. 72 In response, supporters
argued opponents were trying to confuse voters with unwarranted
charges of ambiguity.73 Certainly the Church's position on the
Referendum created uncertainty in the minds of some voters.
While many voters undoubtedly cast their votes based on
principled views about abortion, a good number of voters probably
experienced difficulty sorting out the apparent ambiguities of the
Referendum. Opinion polls reflected this confusion. By March 6,
67. Coulter, Four Main Aims, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. Abortion Debate Emerges Again to Vanquish Illusion of Consensus, IR. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2001, at 10; Carol Coulter, Mother And Child Campaign Opposes Referendum on
Basis of Legal Advice, IR. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at 5; Why I Cannot Back This
Constitutional Amendment Bill; People Should Reject the Government's Latest
Constitutional Proposa4 Argues Roderick O'Hanlon, IR. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at 16.
70. See, Ivana Bacik, Hypocrisy and Fear in Debate on Abortion, IR. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2001, at 14; Eithne Donnellan, New Alliance of Pro-Life Groups Describes Referendum as
Fundamentally Flawed, IR. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, at 8.
71. See Declan Fahy, Political Parties 'Confuse' Voters, IR. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at 6
(noting numerous editorials in regional newspapers on state of confusing debate on
Referendum).
72. See Confusing and Divisive, IR. TIMES, Feb. 25,2002, at 13.
73. Patsy McGarry & Dennis Coghlan, Confusion a Deliberate Tactic by No Side,
Says Bishop, IR. TIMES, Mar. 4,2002, at 1.
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voters were so closely divided that the polls were unable to predict
the outcome of the vote.
74
IV. ANALYZING THE REFERENDUM
Although the government presented the Referendum as a
carefully and thoughtfully drafted proposal, opponents quickly
found fault. While the popular press discussed the underlying
merits of the Referendum during the campaign, much of the
debate focused on the structure and the language of the
Referendum. 75 An exploration of these arguments may explain
the ultimate defeat of the Referendum.
This section explores the potential ambiguities in the
structure and text of the Referendum. First, the structure of the
Referendum deviated from traditional amendments because it
combined statutory and Constitutional language. In addition, the
Referendum required voters to address several related issues with
one vote only, creating confusion for voters that supported some
provisions and opposed others. Second, the text, particularly the
definitions, raised questions of clarity. Although there were some
textually ambiguous definitions, opponents ignored those
ambiguities. Instead, opponents of the Referendum focused on
relatively unambiguous definitions and claimed they were, in fact,
fatally ambiguous or vague. Third, the Referendum left important
issues unresolved, and ultimately deferred to future governments
to resolve those issues. Finally, with respect to the "morning
after" pill, the Referendum left open the possibility that its passage
would result in unintended consequences, and consequently failed
to resolve this critical issue.
A. Ambiguity in Form: The Referendum's Structure
Although the Referendum sought to amend the Constitution,
it did not look like a typical amendment in either form or
structure. In fact, technically, the voters were not voting on the
actual language of the Referendum. Rather, the specific question
placed before the voters was:
74. Yes Voters Hold Narrow Majority but the Electorate Remains Highly Confused,
IR. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002.
75. This Article relies primarily on Ireland's principle national newspaper, The Irish
Times, for records of the debate as played out in the popular press. Although Ireland has
dozens of regional and local newspapers, The Irish Times is the most widely circulated,
and easily accessible source for contemporary analysis of the Referendum.
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Do you approve of the proposal to amend the
Constitution in the undermentioned Bill?
Twenty-fifth Amendment of the Constitution (Protection of
Human Life in Pregnancy) Bill, 2001.76
The Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act, if passed,
would be the law on abortion. While the text of the act would not
be added to the Constitution, it would have the same status as a
Constitutional amendment. Before the Referendum, the
government had never combined a Constitutional amendment
with a statute.
77
After the government studied the abortion issue for nearly
five years, Fianna Fail's leaders became convinced that a
traditional Constitutional amendment, similar to the one in 1992,
would not adequately address the abortion issue.78 A single
amendment repealing the suicide exemption, for example, would
not resolve the myriad abortion issues such as the status of
emergency contraception. Likewise, the Constitution would
constrain any effort to resolve those issues solely through
legislation. Simply put, the government sought to combine the
specificity of statutory language with the force of a Constitutional
amendment. As a result, greater specificity in a Constitutional
amendment would implicitly restrain judicial activism, and
therefore, avoid future cases such as the X Case.
The amendment/statute nature of the Referendum was not,
strictly speaking, ambiguous. The potential effect was clear. If the
voters approved the Referendum, the government would enact the
Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act and it would have the
force of a Constitutional amendment. While this
amendment/statute approach generated little opposition, it did
present some challenges.
79
76. REFERENDUM COMMISSION, USE YOUR VOTE: TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION (PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIFE IN PREGNANCY) BILL 3, available
at http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/special/2002/abortioninfo/index.pdf (last visited Mar.
11, 2003) [hereinafter USE YOUR VOTE].
77. Morris v. Minister for the Env't & Local Gov't (Ir. High Ct. Feb. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2002/5.html.
78. See Government Plans Comprehensive Approach, supra note 60, at 6.
79. But see Morris v. Minister for the Env't & Local Gov't (Ir. High Ct. Feb. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2002/5.html (holding the challenge of
Referendum's constitutionality unsuccessful); Mary Carolan, High Court Dismisses
Students' Challenge to Abortion Referendum, IR. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at 6.
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The government offered the amendment/statute approach to
assure voters that the Referendum would provide more certainty
than prior amendments. Because many voters were skeptical of
entrusting the Supreme Court to implement the details of abortion
policy, the government drafted legislation that attempted to
resolve many issues relating to abortion, including controversies
surrounding the suicide exception, emergency contraception, and
the right to travel for the purpose of obtaining an abortion in
another country. However, while the language was more specific
than Constitutional language, it was not immune from charges of
ambiguity or vagueness. In fact, by drafting more specific
language, the government provided more details for opponents to
attack. Furthermore, the amendment/statute approach shifted the
debate from abortion policy to the implementation of that policy.80
The sheer number of details addressed in the statute complicated
the debate, especially for voters who lacked the technical expertise
necessary to fully assess the language of the Referendum and its
possible implementation.
The statutory nature of the Referendum also created another
problem, namely, logrolling. The Referendum required the voters
to cast only one vote that necessarily encompassed several distinct
issues.81 A "Yes" vote would repeal the suicide exception, 82
exclude the use of emergency contraception from the meaning of
abortion,83 give the government the power to designate approved
medical facilities where abortions could be performed,84 and
require doctors to create a written record of their medical opinions
regarding risks faced by their patients. 85 This created a conflict for
a voter who, for example, opposed the suicide exception, as well as
the "morning after" pill. Likewise, voters who supported the
suicide exception and supported access to the "morning after" pill
80. See, e.g., Fergus, O'Ferrall, Editorial, Health Concerns Raised by the Protection of
Human Life in Pregnancy Act, IR. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, http://www.adelaide.ie/
notices/20020204referendum.html (stating that vagueness of "approved places" threatens
emergencies that occur in pregnancies); Carol Coulter, Emergency Terminations Not
Necessary, Says Martin, IR. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at 6 (responding to Adelaide Hospital
Society press release, by asserting referendum poses no threat to emergency health care).
81. Geraldine Kennedy, Yes or No-You Cannot Pick and Choose, IR. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2002, at 6 [hereinafter Kennedy, Yes or No].
82. Referendum § 1.2.
83. Id.
84. Id. § 1.3.
85. Id.
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were faced with voting "Yes" to safeguard the availability of the
"morning after" pill at the expense of the suicide exception, or to
vote "No" and preserve the suicide exception at the expense of
losing access to the "morning after" pill.
86
In general, legislation often addresses a number of issues and
legislators must weigh the overall strengths and weaknesses of
proposed legislation before casting their votes. In addition,
legislators play a much greater role in the drafting of legislation
than the typical voter. Thus, legislators are more familiar with the
larger political process, which includes logrolling. While
legislators may be comfortable with the realities of political
compromise, voters may be a bit more reluctant to support
legislation that promotes one of their values at the expense of
another.
Even if the language of the Referendum was unquestionably
clear, the structure of the Referendum concerned many voters.
Since it demanded the consideration of particular details, the
Referendum muted the debate over the policy in general. Some
provisions supported changes advocated by the pro-choice camp,
while other provisions appealed to the pro-life camp. Therefore,
while the government tried to promote the Referendum as
bringing "certainty to where it was lacking," 87 many voters viewed
its conflicting provisions as a confusing muddle.
Opponents did not limit their criticism to the structure of the
Referendum. As discussed below, they also attacked the specific
language of the Referendum and its potential consequences.
B. Ambiguity in Text: The Referendum's Definitions
1. The definition of "abortion"
a. the intended effect of the definition of "abortion"
The Referendum's definition of "abortion" attempted to
resolve a couple of issues.88 First, it attempted to eliminate the
86. See Kennedy, Yes or No, supra note 81.
87. Bertie Ahern, Statement at Fianna Fail Referendum Press Conference (Apr. 3,
2002), at http://www.fiannafaii.ie/archive-article.php4?id=487.
88. The Referendum defines abortion as:
(1) The intentional destruction by any means of unborn human life after
implantation in the womb of a woman.
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suicide exception, which would overturn the X Case.89
Interestingly, this was the only part of the Referendum that all
parties agreed was clear on its face. While intense debates on the
merits of the suicide exception existed, no one argued this change
would have unintended consequences. 90  In fact, had the
government only proposed an amendment that repealed the
suicide exception, no one would have made charges of ambiguity.
Indeed, considering the change in the political climate in the ten
years since that issue was brought before the voters, a proposal
limited to repealing the suicide exception may well have passed.
In 1992, a similar referendum was opposed by the pro-life
advocates on one side and the pro-choice advocates on the other.91
Anti-abortion advocates opposed the 1992 Referendum because it
"still allowed for abortion in limited circumstances." 92 Similarly,
the Catholic Church refused to support the 1992 Referendum.
93
By 2002, however, many anti-abortion advocates had moderated
their views and accepted the reality that most Irish people
supported abortion in the limited circumstance where it was
necessary to save the mother's life. In addition, the Church began
to moderate its stringent anti-abortion position. 94 The Church's
new position on the issue should have garnered greater support
than in 1992. However, because the government attempted to
resolve too many issues connected with the abortion debate, the
Referendum, including its definition of "abortion," was subject to
an entire campaign focused on charges of ambiguity and
unintended consequences.
The second issue raised by the Referendum's definition of
''abortion" was whether an unborn life would be protected under
the law. According to the Referendum, the definition of
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, abortion does not include
carrying out of a medical procedure by a medical practitioner at an approved
place in the course of which or as a result of which unborn human life is ended
where the procedure is, in the reasonable opinion of the practitioner, necessary
to prevent a real and substantial risk of loss of the woman's life other than by
self-destruction.
Referendum § 1.1, 1.2.
89. See Referendum § 1.2.
90. Government Plans Comprehensive Approach, supra note 60.
91. KINGSTON & WHELAN, supra note 10, at 19.
92. Id.
93. See Jeffrey A. Weinstein, Note, "An Irish Solution to an Irish Problem": Ireland's
Struggle with Abortion Law, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165, 197 (1993).
94. See McGarry & Brennock, supra note 64.
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"abortion" did not include termination of an unborn life before
implantation in the womb.95  This established a clear and
unambiguous starting point with respect to when unborn life was
protected. Some doctors, however, argued that this definition of
abortion, unlike the definition with which doctors were used to
working, contained no ending point of "unborn life" short of
term.9
6
Medical dictionaries generally define "abortion" as
termination of pregnancy before viability.97 In the absence of a
definition that is based on viability, the Referendum could result in
late term abortions, even after viability. 98  This argument,
however, overlooks a couple of points.
First, existing Irish law does not define abortion in terms of
viability, end of term, or any other 'end point. Thus, the
Referendum did not add to the uncertainty. In addition, the
Referendum did not give the Court any discretion to define the
end point. Indeed, the legislature's failure to resolve this
ambiguity may be a legitimate reason to oppose the Referendum.
A logical reading of the Referendum, however, suggests the
Referendum does resolve the question of whether post-viability
abortions are permissible.
Senator Mary Henry, M.D., a pro-choice advocate, implied
that the Referendum's failure to limit abortion to pre-viability
situations would permit abortions in post-viability cases,99 and
therefore, abortions would be permitted in cases where they would
have been previously prohibited. This is a very unlikely result.
The Referendum generally barred abortion. Thus, an intentional
termination of a pregnancy, either before or after viability, was
generally prohibited. The only termination of pregnancy
permitted under the Referendum had to fall outside the definition
of abortion. The only terminations of pregnancy that fell outside
the definition of abortion were those "necessary to prevent the
real and substantial risk of loss of the woman's life, other than by
self-destruction."100 A termination of a pregnancy, after viability,
95. Referendum § 1.1.





100. Referendum § 1.1.
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would most likely not fall within this exception. If the unborn
child is viable, it is difficult to imagine a situation where an
abortion would be necessary to protect the life of the woman. In
that situation, both lives should be protected if possible.
Senator Henry's concern about the lack of an endpoint for
abortions also fails to put the Referendum in proper context. The
Referendum must be construed with the rest of the Constitution,
including the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment
recognises the right to life of an unborn child.10 1 Thus, the
Referendum's exception to the definition of abortion, which
sacrifices the right to life of an unborn child in favor of the
woman's life in certain circumstances, would have to be narrowly
and consistently construed with the rest of Article 40.3. It seems
unlikely that a court would construe that exception to permit the
death of the unborn child once the unborn child was viable outside
the womb.
b. unwarranted criticism outside the scope of the referendum
Critics claimed that the failure of the Referendum to define
"unborn life" fully left unresolved issues regarding in vitro
fertilization, 10 2 stem cell research, and other developing medical
technologies. 10 3 Although these criticisms were undoubtedly true,
those types of technological advances created legal and moral
ambiguities as to how to define "unborn" and life itself. Clearly,
those issues were beyond the scope of the Referendum. The
Referendum only defined the limits of abortion. It did not address
the full scope of the Eighth Amendment, and indeed, it was not
meant to address those larger concerns.
Although the Referendum did not resolve all of the issues
mentioned above, it does not mean that it was ambiguous or
unduly vague as to the issues the Referendum intended to address.
Those raising these concerns may correctly argue that the Eighth
Amendment's protection of "unborn life" needs to be re-examined
due to the scientific advances made during the past twenty years.
This, however, highlights only the moral and social ambiguities of
the Eighth Amendment with regard to issues beyond abortion. It
101. Art 40.3.3, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
102. Deirdre Madden, Referendum on Abortion, IR. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at 15.
103. Breda O'Brien, Adelaide Proposals Fail to Protect Human Life, IR. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2001, at 16.
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does not establish that the Referendum created more ambiguities
that would have resulted in unintended consequences. Those
arguments merely recognise that the meaning of "unborn life" is
increasingly uncertain due to technology. Even if the Referendum
were enacted, legal issues regarding the Eighth Amendment would
remain. The Referendum, while possibly attempting to do too
much, was never proffered as the final word on issues relating to
the definition of life dr the unborn in particular.
2. The definition of "reasonable opinion"
Definitions are commonly used in statutes to provide a
specific technical definition for a term of art.104 Where a term is
unambiguous and the intent is to give the term its plain meaning, a
definition is unnecessary. Where the drafter has included an
intentionally vague 10 5 or general term, a definition is similarly
unnecessary since the meaning of such a term is purposely left to
later courts and legislatures to resolve. 10 6
The Referendum included intentionally vague terms. For
instance, section one of the Referendum allows a medical
practitioner to end an unborn life where, in the medical
practitioner's "reasonable opinion," doing so is necessary to
prevent a real and substantial threat to a woman's life. 10 7
"Reasonable opinion" is an example of a term that is deliberately
vague. The drafters recognized that medical diagnosis is not as
precise as the law envisions. The reasonableness of a medical
opinion will often depend on the specific facts facing the medical
practitioner. Trying to provide a more precise definition is both
politically and practically very difficult. Thus, the drafters chose
an intentionally vague term to allow for unforeseen future
situations. Due to the difficulty of anticipating future events, an
open-ended definition makes sense.
This inherent vagueness does not, of course, mean that the
term "reasonable opinion" is a standard without meaning.
Certainly there are opinions that easily fall inside or outside the
scope of a "reasonable opinion." However, the difficulty lies at
the margins. For example, imagine a medical opinion that in
104. SUSAN L. BRODY ET AL., LEGAL DRAFTING 336 (1994).
105. For the distinction between ambiguous and vague terms, see REED DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 48-51 (1975).
106. See id at 49-50.
107. Referendum § 1.2.
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retrospect was clearly wrong, but at the time offered was merely
questionable, and thus supportable to some degree. Whether that
opinion was "reasonable" would have to be determined through
the court process. This was what the drafters intended, and
therefore, it was not necessary for the drafters to define
"reasonable opinion" any further. Nonetheless, section one of the
Referendum defines "reasonable opinion" as a "reasonable
opinion formed in good faith which has regard to the need to
preserve unborn human life where practicable and of which a
written record has been made and signed by the practitioner.' 10 8
This definition did not clarify the inherent, vagueness of
"reasonable opinion." First, it is circular because it defines
reasonable opinion as a reasonable opinion formed in good faith.
Second, it is difficult to imagine an opinion, reasonable or not, that
was not formed in good faith. A "good faith" opinion must mean
an opinion that is actually held. However, this is true of all
opinions. One who asserts a proposition that he does not believe
is not asserting an opinion at all. He is simply lying. Thus, all
opinions must be good faith opinions. Since there is no such thing
as a bad faith opinion, this definition does not clarify anything. It
merely states the tautology that a "reasonable opinion" must be an
opinion and not a lie.
Proponents of the Referendum may argue that by defining
"reasonable opinion" as requiring good faith, the Referendum
ensures that "reasonable opinion" will be broadly construed,
making it difficult for later courts to second guess medical
practitioners. This reasoning assumes that "good faith opinion" is
a more concrete term than "reasonable opinion." Perhaps this is
so. But this just means the drafters should have used "opinion"
instead of "reasonable opinion."
Defining "reasonable opinion" as a "good faith opinion"
creates another problem. A "reasonable opinion" creates an
objective standard-that which a reasonable person in the same
position would hold. On the other hand, a "good faith opinion"
creates a subjective standard-that which the doctor herself
actually believed. By using a subjective term to define an
objective standard, the drafters created an internal ambiguity.
Supporters could counter this theory by arguing that the
definition was intended to establish that the medical practitioner's
108. Referendum § 1.3.
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opinion must be both objectively reasonable and subjectively
honest. Such definitions are common in both commercial law and
criminal law. That such definitions are common, however, does
not make them necessary. As noted above, all opinions are
subjectively honest, or they are not opinions at all. Thus, a
"reasonable opinion" necessarily includes the subjective standard.
The definition of "reasonable belief" was also unnecessarily
redundant. In addition to requiring a good faith belief, the
definition required the medical practitioner to preserve an unborn
human life where practicable.' 0 9 Article 40.3.3, however, already
requires the life of the unborn to be balanced against the life of the
mother.110 Surely, a "reasonable opinion" must be consistently
construed with expressed Constitutional mandates. A medical
opinion that ignored the life of the unborn would thus be
inherently unreasonable. Thus, the clause did not add clarity to
the meaning of "reasonable opinion" and was merely redundant.
3. The definition of "woman"
The Referendum also defined a term that seems incapable of
misinterpretation. The Referendum defined "woman" as "a
female person."' It is difficult to imagine anyone interpreting
"woman" to mean anything but a female person. That is, after all,
the clear, plain meaning of the word.112 As such, the definition
was unnecessary.
It is conceivable the drafters wanted to make clear that
"woman" also meant young females in order to avoid drawing a
distinction between girls and adult women. However, in the
context of this Referendum, it is unimaginable that anyone would
draw such a distinction, which would essentially prohibit abortions
for adult women, while permitting abortion for girls. Such a
meaning could not be considered seriously. Still, if the drafters
wanted to be certain that the term included all females and not just
adult females, they could have achieved that precision without
defining "woman." A simpler solution would have been to use
"female person" instead of "woman" in the two places where the
term is used in section one of the Referendum.
109. Id.
110. Art 40.3.3, Constitution of Ireland, 1937.
111. Referendum § 1.3.
112. "Woman: ... 1. A female human being." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 2629 (3rd ed. 1986).
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It may seem that quibbling over ineffective definitions is
significant only to pointy headed professors living in ivory towers.
After all, what harm can a redundant definition have? However,
ineffective definitions may potentially cause mischief. When
courts interpret positive law, they must give effect to every word.
Logic demands that when drafters define terms, they must have a
reason for doing so. Thus, the drafters of the Referendum must
have intended "a female person" to mean something more precise
than "woman." This leaves the courts to determine what that
distinction might be. It is difficult to imagine a setting in which the
distinction might arise. However, that is the danger that
ineffective definitions create. Somewhere down the road, a
situation might arise where the meaning of woman is disputed and
the definition will create interpretive problems for whoever is
called upon to give meaning to the term. Positive law must be
drafted in anticipation of unforeseeable future events. Therefore,
drafters should strive to avoid unnecessary definitions, like that of
"woman."
4. The meaning of "real and substantial risk"
Although the Referendum drafters defined terms like
"reasonable belief" and "woman," they left undefined one of the
vaguest terms in the Referendum. The Referendum excludes
medical procedures necessary "to prevent a real and substantial
risk of loss of the woman's life" from abortion. 113 Surely what
constitutes a "real and substantial risk" is subject to differing
interpretations. On one hand, it is surprising that the drafters
deferred the resolution of this ambiguity to the courts. On the
other hand, since the term was first used in the X Case, the
drafter's choice is not so surprising.114 The Supreme Court's
repeated use of the term suggests that it carries the weight of a
Constitutional term of art.
While the precise meaning of "real and substantial risk" may
not be clearly articulated, the Supreme Court limited it.
Accordingly, it does not include a risk, no matter how serious, to
the health of a woman.115 Thus, the risks to a woman who faced
severe, but not fatal, medical complications from a continued
113. Referendum § 1.2 (emphasis added).
114. Attorney Gen. v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 53 (Ire.).
115. See id. (emphasis added).
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pregnancy, would not fall within the Referendum's exclusion.
However, just how "substantial" a risk to the life of a woman must
be remains an open question. For example, neither existing case
law nor the Referendum clarified whether a woman could have a
lawful abortion if her pregnancy accentuated chronic medical
problems, which would lead to her premature, but not immediate,
death. Nonetheless, there was little opposition to the use of "real
and substantial risk" in the Referendum. Overall, there seemed to
be general agreement to allow the Court to resolve the inherent
vagueness of this term.
C. Ambiguity of Deference: The Details of Place and Manner
In addition to the definition of abortion discussed above,
section one of the Referendum also contained the following
exclusion:
[A]bortion does not include carrying out of a medical
procedure by a medical practitioner at an approved place in the
course of which or as a result of which unborn human life is
ended where the procedure is, in the reasonable opinion of the
practitioner, necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of
loss of the woman's life other than by self-destruction. 116
The Referendum defined "approved place" and "medical
practitioner":
"[A]pproved place" means a place in the State approved for the
time being by order as being suitable for the purposes of this
section.
"[M]edical practitioner" means a person permitted by law for
the time being to practice as a registered medical practitioner in
the State.117
At first blush, these provisions appear not only reasonable,
but prudent. The government certainly does not want abortions
performed by unqualified practitioners, and state certification is a
reasonable way to assure that those performing the "medical
procedure" are competent. Likewise, the government has a strong
interest in ensuring that these procedures are performed in a safe
environment. Nonetheless, opponents viewed this provision as
government over-reaching.
116. Referendum § 1.2 (emphasis added).
117. Id. § 1.3.
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Opponents were concerned that these medical procedures
could only be performed at places approved by the State. n 8 This
gave the State the power to limit where these procedures could
occur. Opponents feared the State could effectively ban these
medical procedures by severely limiting the availability of
approved facilities since there were no other standards by which
the State approved these facilities. This would place pregnant
women facing emergency complications at risk during their
pregnancy. 119
The State, of course, denied any hidden agenda. It claimed
the provision was merely written to ensure that the medical
procedures were performed safely. It assured voters that the
details of State-approved places would be worked out in due
course. Opponents, however, regarded this measure skeptically-
a bit like the fox assuring the farmer that it would carefully guard
the hen house.
Ahern had repeatedly stated his opposition to abortion in
general, and in particular, the X Case. 120 The Referendum was
intended to repeal the X Case. The government's clear anti-
abortion position gave support to those who suggested the
government could not be trusted to implement fair procedures for
approving facilities.
Furthermore, a related provision fueled skepticism of the
government's true agenda. The Referendum required that a
medical practitioner's "reasonable opinion" be documented in
writing.121 In addition, section 5.2 of the Referendum provided:
An order may make such provision relating to the making,
keeping and confirmation of records (including records of
opinions) of medical procedures referred to in section 1 of this
Act as may be considered by the member of the Government
concerned necessary or appropriate for the purpose of this
Act.
122
118. See, e.g., Alliance for a No Vote, Abortion Bill Will Make Ireland an Unsafe Place
to be Pregnant (Dec. 9, 2001), at http://flag.blackened.net/revoit/issues/choice/
anv/press/wessexDEC9.html.
119. Id.
120. Mark Brennock, Ahern Warns of 'Liberal Abortion Regime', IR. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2002, at 8 [hereinafter Brennock, Liberal Abortion Regime].
121. Referendum § 1.3.
122- Id. § 5.2.
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Opponents viewed these provisions as a threat to a woman's
right to confidentiality. 123 Such threats could potentially expose
doctors and women to criminal prosecution. 124 The government
refuted those charges, arguing that the provisions were merely
implemented to protect women. In addition, the government
claimed the medical records would not be made available to the
government 125  In essence, the government's position was
effectively reduced to a requirement that it be trusted to
implement the details fairly.
Adding to the difficulty the government faced on this point
was the likelihood that the alleged goal of these provisions could
be achieved in the absence of the provisions. First, the
Referendum only excluded "medical procedures" from the
meaning of abortion.126 Thus, the crude methods of back alley
abortionists would not fall within the exclusion anyway. More
importantly, Ireland already regulated the practice of medicine. 127
Thus, any unlicensed practitioner who performed a medical
procedure would already be subject to sanction. 128 Therefore,
permitting only licensed practitioners to perform the medical
procedures was redundant.
Second, allowing medical procedures to be performed only in
State-approved facilities was similarly unnecessary to guarantee
the safety of women. Again, only licensed medical practitioners
could legally perform these procedures. Licensed medical
practitioners, by virtue of their license, are subject to sanction if
they commit professional misconduct. 129 Even without required
State approval for facilities that perform these specific procedures,
a medical practitioner would be required to perform these
procedures in a safe environment. The State would retain its
authority to ensure the facilities were safe through its existing
authority to regulate the medical profession.
It may very well be that the drafters of the Referendum
included these provisions to assure anti-abortion advocates that
the State would continue to closely regulate abortions in limited
123. Muiris Houston, Referendum Bill 'Threat to Confidentiality', IR. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2002, at 5.
124. Id. If convicted, both doctors and patients could face up to twelve years in jail.
125. Id.
126. Referendum § 1.1.
127. Medical Practitioners Act § 35 (1978) (Ir.).
128. Seeid.§45.
129. See id. § 45(a).
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circumstances, and thus, restrict the availability of abortion in
Ireland. If this was the case, their agenda failed, at least in part.
Zealous pro-life advocates not only opposed the Referendum, but
argued the Referendum was fatally ambiguous. Furthermore, they
argued it would increase risks to women and children.
130
These unnecessary provisions, at the very least, hinted at
excessive governmental intrusion into the doctor-patient
relationship. As a result, these provisions created greater
skepticism among pro-choice voters.131 By closing one can of
worms, the potentially increased availability of abortions, the
government opened another, the fear of greater government
intrusion into private medical decisions.
D. Ambiguity of Consequences: The "Morning After" Pill
Perhaps the most contentious debate about the Referendum
centred on the status of "emergency contraception." "Emergency
contraception" is the euphemism for post-coital contraception.
132
This includes IUDs and the "morning after" pill.133 The legal
status of the "morning after" pill in Ireland is somewhat unclear.
To the extent that emergency contraception ends the life of the
unborn, its use would clearly violate Article 40.3.3 of the
Constitution in most circumstances. However, in 2001, the Irish
Medicines Board licensed the "morning after" pill, finding that it
was not an abortifacient. 134 This appeared to open the door for its
routine availability. However, while Referendum supporters
asserted that the Referendum would guarantee the availability of
emergency contraception, 135 opponents argued that it did not
resolve constitutional questions about the "morning after" pill.
136
In fact, the Referendum, while clearly drafted, was not responsive
to the realities of those issues. In effect, the Referendum failed to
address the problem completely.
To understand the Referendum's potential ambiguity with
regard to emergency contraception, the relevant portion of the
130. Donnellan, supra note 70, at 8.
131. See Houston, supra note 123.
132. Irish Family Planning Association, Virtual Guide to Contraception, at
http://www.ifpa.ie/contraception/em.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
133. Id.
134. Allison O'Connor, Board Approves Use of Morning After Pill, IR. TIMES, Nov.
14,2001, at 1.
135. Brian Cowen, The Referendum Vote: Yes, IR. TIMES, Feb. 18,2002, at 18.
136. See, e.g., Tom O'Dowd, Vote No, IR. TIMES, Mar. 4,2002, at 14.
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Referendum must be examined. In this Act, "abortion" means the
intentional destruction by any means of unborn human life after
implantation in the womb of a woman. 137
The government argued this language provided constitutional
protection for emergency contraception. 138 The "morning after"
pill, when used properly, works like other birth control pills. It
prevents pregnancy by slowing or preventing ovulation. 139 In
some cases, it may prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the
uterus. 140 Thus, by defining abortion as the destruction of unborn
human life after implantation, the Referendum excluded
emergency contraception from the meaning of abortion. Thus,
under the express and unambiguous language of the Referendum,
the use of the "morning after" pill (and other emergency
contraception) would not constitute an abortion. Since the
drafters designed the Referendum to establish the limits of
permitted abortion, this language seems to clearly resolve the
issue: emergency contraception is permitted.
Despite this unambiguous language, opponents nevertheless
attacked the Referendum on this point. Specifically, opponents
argued the Referendum did not constitutionally guarantee access
to the "morning after" pill.141 While the Referendum itself may
have permitted the "morning after" pill, it left open the possibility
of legal challenges to emergency contraception based upon other
constitutional principles.
The possibility of such challenges became quite evident in the
midst of the campaign. In February, Catholic Bishops released a
statement, that in their view, the Referendum did not address the
issue of emergency contraception. 142 The Bishops asserted that
the existing Article 40.3.3 protected the life of the unborn because
the life of the unborn begins at conception. 143  While the
Referendum excluded emergency contraception from the
137. Referendum § 1.1 (emphasis added).
138. Carol Coulter, Government Maintains Bill Strikes Balance, IR. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2001, at 6.
139. Assoc. of Reproductive Health Professionals, Emergency Contraception: Train the
Trainer Slides (Dec. 17, 2002), at http://www.arhp.org/healthcareproviders/
visitingfacultyprograms/index.cfm?ID=251.
140. Id.
141. Brennock, Liberal Abortion Regime, supra note 120, at 8.
142 See Mark Brennock, Rift over Referendum Widened by Bishop's Comments, IR.
TIMES, Feb. 25,2002, at 1.
143. Id.
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definition of abortion, it did not define "life of the unborn" in
Article 40.3.3. Thus, while the use of the "morning after" pill may
not have been a criminal act (i.e. an abortion) under the
Referendum, the use of the "morning after" pill could violate the
unborn child's right to life under Article 40.3.3. The Bishops'
position illustrated the possibility of successful legal challenges to
emergency contraception even if voters approved the
Referendum.
Although the government tried to downplay its conflict with
the Bishops on this issue, 144 the uncertain future of the "morning
after" pill hindered its efforts to present the Referendum as an
unambiguous resolution of the abortion issue. Those efforts took
another blow from the Referendum Commission. The
Commission was a non-partisan group 145 that explained the
Referendum in as simple and effective terms as possible and
promoted public awareness of the Referendum. 146 In the Voters'
Brochure that explained the Referendum, the Commission
asserted the Referendum would not affect the constitutional status
of the "morning after" pill. 147
The Referendum failed to resolve the "morning after" pill
issue because it did not even address the issue. At the heart of the
"morning after" pill debate lays an important issue: At what point,
does the life of the unborn begin? The Referendum drew a bright
line marking when unborn life begins for the purposes of abortion.
However, Article 40.3.3 protects the life of the unborn generally,
and is not limited to protection from abortion. Article 40.3.3 does
not provide guidance as to when unborn life begins. Although the
Referendum clearly and unambiguously resolved the status of
emergency contraception vis-di-vis abortion, it failed to address the
underlying ambiguity inherent in Article 40.3.3. Its failure to
address this more fundamental and infinitely more controversial
problem left the Referendum open to charges of ambiguity and
unintended results.
144. Id.
145. Referendum Act § 2.3 (1998) (Ir.), available at http://www.gov.ie/bills28/acts/
1998/a198.pdf.
146. Id. § 3.
147. USE YOUR VOTE, supra note 76, at 10.
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V. How SKEPTICISM HELPED DEFEAT THE REFERENDUM
It is a common strategy of those opposed to legislation of any
kind to claim that the legislation in question is ambiguous, vague,
and incomplete. Surely, no drafter of positive law can possibly
anticipate all future events or pass any positive law that is not an
amalgam of compromise. This does not mean that the drafter
must always concede that the law is so fraught with uncertain
consequences as to be untenable.
Typically, legislators can counter the ambiguity argument in
one of three ways. First, they can argue the proposed law is not
ambiguous or vague. In fact, the meaning is as clear as it can be
considering the limitations of language. Second, the vagueness is
intentional and that some issues are best left to later resolution
through subsequent legislation, regulation, or litigation.148 Finally,
the legislature could address any ambiguity that proves
troublesome through an amendment. However, in this case, those
rebuttals to the ambiguity argument were not enough to salvage
the Referendum.
For example, even though the repeal of the X Case suicide
exception was clearly expressed, along with the provision that
unborn life was protected only after implantation, a number of
events created skepticism among Irish voters. That skepticism
proved to be fertile soil in which opponents could plant seeds of
doubt through claims of ambiguity.
A. Skepticism Toward the Courts and the Executive Branch
The 1983 Amendment was intended to be a strong pro-life
amendment. 149 Yet, it opened the door for the Supreme Court to
legalize abortion, at least in some circumstances. Advocates on
both sides of the issue have consistently attacked the X Case as an
example of flawed legal reasoning.150 Whether or not such
criticism was warranted, 151 the Court's ruling has created the
public perception that the Court was willing to distort clear and
unambiguous language to achieve its objective. Many voters may
148. See DICKERSON, supra note 105, at 49-50.
149. KINGSTON & WHELAN, supra note 10, at 4-5.
150. See, e.g., William Binchy, Abortion Law Just Part of the Solution, IR. TIMES, Aug.
17,2000, at 14.
151. See Fintan O'Toole, A Judge Puts Government in the Dock, IR. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2000, at 10 (arguing government inaction and incompetence forces courts to act).
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have believed the Court could potentially distort and misinterpret
the Referendum.
Admitting that the Referendum could have been intentionally
vague also proved problematic. The government, for example,
could easily explain that governmental agencies with the expertise
to provide proper oversight are in the best position to identify
"approved places." The voters, however, have to trust those who
will ultimately give meaning to those vague terms before they give
their approval. Again, the court system would ultimately resolve
any ambiguity. Unfortunately, many voters, who favored stronger
limits on abortion, distrusted the Court's willingness to interpret
the Referendum narrowly. Simply put, pro-life voters were
unwilling to defer the interpretation of vague terms to the Court.
On the other hand, those who favored the liberalization of
abortion laws would be less likely to object to a law that gave
greater deference to the Court. After all, the widespread
perception was that the Court had expanded the availability of
abortions in Ireland. Instead, the power the Executive Branch
held to restrict abortion made it difficult for pro-choice advocates
to approve the Referendum. For example, section 1.3 of the
Referendum deferred decisions recognizing "approved places" to
the Executive Branch. Pro-choice voters were less likely to trust
the government to implement fairly the details left unanswered by
the Referendum. Of course, pro-choice voters were already
predisposed to oppose the Referendum because it unquestionably
sought to limit the availability of abortions by eliminating the
suicide exception. Deference to governmental regulation made
support from this group of voters even less likely.
B. Attempts to Gain Approval in the Midst of Skepticism
To pass the Referendum, the government had to win the
support of the growing number of voters who sought a "middle
ground" on the issue.152 The government needed the support of
the voters who believed the Court was partially, but not wholly,
correct in the X Case. In other words, the government needed to
garner the approval of the voters who viewed abortion as an
appropriate choice where the life of a woman is at risk, but who
152. As should be evident, the "middle ground" in Ireland is considerably further
toward the "pro-life" end of the spectrum than the "middle ground" of the debate in the
United States.
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were unwilling to accept suicide as a basis for creating that risk.
These voters were also likely to be skeptical of the Court. After
all, the X Case led to ten years of political and legal debate, along
with constant harping about judicial activism.
In essence, the government was asking voters to limit the
authority of the Court by approving a Referendum that left the
details to resolution by the same Court. In this context, it was not
surprising that voters were reluctant to embrace the government's
proposal. Some voters were concerned the Referendum gave too
much power to the Court while others were equally concerned that
it did not give enough. Even though the text may have been
unambiguous, opponents were able to raise effective arguments
about the uncertain future interpretation of that text.
Moreover, government assurance that the State would work
out the key unresolved details was unlikely to garner many votes.
While Fianna Fail remains the most popular political party,153 and
Bertie Ahern remains personally popular, 154  there is an
undercurrent of mistrust among the voters. Nine months before
the Referendum, the Irish voters rejected the Nice Treaty
referendum despite Ahern's support for it. 155 In addition, Ahern's
government has been marred by repeated scandals. 156 While these
setbacks do not appear to have damaged Ahern's political
popularity, they may have created skepticism among the voters as
to the government's ability to deal with the details of the abortion
issue.
As a result of the skepticism toward both the judiciary and
the government, voters were reluctant to pass a Constitutional
amendment that left important substantive details for later
resolution. The government, however, had an important ally in
overcoming the voter's skepticism. For the first time, the Irish
leaders of the Catholic Church supported legislation that
153. Unison.ie, Election 2002, at http://www.unison.ie/features/election2O02/index.php
(last visited Feb. 19, 2003). In the general election two months after the Referendum was
defeated, Fianna Fail gained eight seats in the Oireachtas. It now holds eighty-one of a
possible 166 seats and easily put together a coalition government.
154. Mark Brennock, Ahern Was Fianna Fail Trump Card in Appealing to Electorate,
IR. TIMES, May 20,2002, at 2.
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permitted limited abortions.157 Historically, a coalition between
Fianna Fail and the Church was an unbeatable force in the
political arena. 158 Certainly, on an issue like abortion that speaks
to core religious values, the support of the Church carries great
influence among many Irish voters. More importantly, the
Church, unlike judges and politicians, historically had the trust of
Irish voters. Although assurances from politicians about the
interpretation of the Referendum could be seen as self-serving, the
Church's support would provide the reassurance and trust
necessary to gain the support of those voters. That was true
historically, but not today.
C. Failure to Gain Approval
In Ireland, the Catholic Church is reeling from a crisis of its
own. Charges of wide-spread pedophilia,159 and the Church's
reluctance to address the issue appropriately, 160 have seriously
damaged the Church's credibility. This issue goes to the very
essence of the laity's trust of church leaders. Until the Church can
put its own house in order and regain the trust it has lost, it is
unlikely to wield the same political clout it has wielded historically.
The Abortion Referendum came before the Irish voters at a
time of widespread skepticism. The voters, who sought a "middle
ground" on abortion, had no one to trust to resolve the apparent
ambiguities in the Referendum. The Supreme Court's perceived
activism created the need for the Referendum in the first place.
Surely, the Court could not be trusted to resolve the details of the
abortion issue, or to interpret the most general principles expressly
stated in the Eighth Amendment. The government was especially
vulnerable after years of scandal. Church leaders had lost their
moral authority by breaching the trust of their followers. Within
this context, it is not surprising that many voters did not want to
approve a Constitutional amendment that left both real and
perceived ambiguities for later resolution.
157. Fintan O'Toole, No Longer Yielding to Party or Pulpit, Electorate Not Bashful of
Uncertainty, IR. TIMES, Mar. 8,2002, at 14.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Mary Raftery, Child Abuse: The Church Has Got Off the Hook Too
Easily, IR. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at 14; Medb Ruane, Abuse Victims Await Spiritual Gesture
from the Church, IR. TIMES, Mar. 22,2002, at 16.
160. Breda O'Brien, Silence on Child Abuse Is Bleeding the Church, IR. TIMES, Mar.
30, 2002, at 14.
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If the historical tides were not enough to defeat the
Referendum, the government may have sealed its fate by
undermining the third rebuttal to charges of ambiguity. The
government could not reassure the voters that the Referendum
could be revised in the future if it should prove problematic. This
was, after all, a Constitutional amendment and any changes would
follow the same legislative process. The greatest strength of a
Constitutional provision is also its greatest weakness-it is
supreme law. Thus, it cannot be eroded through legislative fiat
and the legislature cannot respond quickly if unforeseen problems
arise.
It is for this reason that Constitutions are drafted in general
terms. General terms are flexible and allow a constitution to adapt
to contemporary situations. Thus, a Referendum drafted with
statute-like specificity could effectively tie the hands of the
Oireachtas as well as the Court. If changes became necessary, the
Oireachtas would have to go through the same difficult
amendment process as it did with the Referendum.
There is a danger in overstating the impact of skepticism on
the Referendum election. The Referendum was only narrowly
defeated. In contrast, a similar Referendum was defeated by a
two-to-one majority ten years earlier. It is likely that the support
of the Church, which did not support the earlier Referendum,
changed the views of a good number of voters. Furthermore,
despite troubles in the past few years, Ahern and Fianna Fail
maintained control of the government in an election held two
months after the Abortion Referendum. Nonetheless, charges of
ambiguity and uncertainty may well have persuaded enough voters
to oppose the Referendum to affect its ultimate outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Irish Abortion Referendum of 2002 resulted in
defeat, there are lessons to be learned from its failure. Perhaps
foremost among these lessons is that swift legal solutions to
difficult and divisive social issues are rarely successful. Bertie
Ahern wanted to resolve the abortion issue through a
constitutional referendum that attempted to placate voters on both
sides of the issue. Despite the relative clarity of the text of the
Referendum, it was criticized for being ambiguous and vague.
While it contained some intentionally vague terms, these terms
were not central to the objectives of the Referendum.
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If the Referendum was textually clear, why did charges of
ambiguity and threats of unforeseen consequences seem to
resonate with the voters? Why were supporters unable to
effectively rebut these charges? This author suggests three factors
that may have led swing voters to ultimately reject the
Referendum. These swing voters preferred to accept the vagaries
of the status quo rather than risk further unsettling the status of
abortion and issues surrounding contraception in Ireland.
First, abortion is a morally ambiguous issue, especially for
swing voters. Over the past ten years, many Irish voters have
come to accept the X Case holding that abortion should be
available where there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the
mother. However, this creates a tension with Catholic tenets and
most Irish remain loyal to the Church. While many Irish voters
may have moderated their anti-abortion views over the past
decade, they remained opposed to "abortion on demand." Those
voters, who were struggling with their beliefs with respect to their
own moral and religious principles, may have been particularly
receptive to arguments that the Referendum would lead to
uncertain consequences.
Second, while the Referendum was textually clear, its effect
was not. Eliminating the suicide exception would have clearly
tightened existing abortion law. However, had it passed, it would
also have signalled the waning of a strong anti-abortion majority.
The 1992 Referendum that would have rowed back the suicide
exception was defeated in large part by voters with strong anti-
abortion feelings who opposed abortion under any circumstances.
Thus, the Referendum created the counter-intuitive paradox in
which a more restrictive law would actually reflect a less restrictive
attitude among voters.
In addition, the attempt to present the Referendum as a
compromise reform failed. On an issue as polarizing as abortion,
common ground is difficult to find. With principled advocates on
both sides who are reluctant to compromise their views, it seems
pointless to find a middle ground. Nevertheless, the Referendum
sought such a compromise. Advocates on both sides of the issue
had multiple provisions from which to choose. Ahern and
supporters attempted to appeal to pro-life voters by eliminating
the suicide exception. In addition, they sought to appeal to pro-
choice voters by expanding the availability of the "morning after"
pill. However, pro-choice voters strongly opposed the elimination
of the suicide exception while pro-life voters were reluctant to
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expand the availability of contraception. Rather than broadening
the appeal of the Referendum among swing voters, the
compromising nature of the Referendum alienated voters on both
sides of the issue.
The reluctance of voters to accept the compromise reflects a
fundamental difference between legislators and voters. Legislators
operate in world of compromise. Negotiation, party discipline,
and trade-offs are fundamental to the legislative process. Voters,
on the other hand, are less comfortable with compromise. This is
especially true on issues as intractable as abortion. Thus, while a
pro-choice legislator may be willing to give up the suicide
exception for broader availability of contraception, a pro-choice
voter may be less likely to accept that trade-off. Consequently, the
kind of compromise that may have been necessary to get the
Referendum through the Oireachtas, may have proved
problematic to voters.
Finally, the Referendum was presented to the voters in a
context of voter skepticism. Many voters distrusted the Supreme
Court on the abortion issue. After all, there was a widespread
perception that the X Case created the problem in the first place.
In addition, the Fianna Fail party and the Catholic Church had
credibility problems that extended far beyond the Referendum.
This skepticism undermined the supporters' ability to reassure the
voters that the Referendum would not result in unintended
consequences.
When the Referendum was first presented to the voters,
opinion polls showed that a majority of voters supported it.
General attitudes towards abortion were unlikely to change as a
result of the Referendum debate. Thus, for opponents to succeed
in defeating the Referendum, they needed to shift the focus of the
debate away from the merits of abortion availability and access to
contraception to potentially uncertain consequences. That
uncertainty could lead even entrenched voters on both sides of the
abortion debate to question the wisdom of the Referendum.
Indeed, the Referendum's narrow defeat reveals the success of
that campaign strategy.
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